Masking is one of the efficient and easily implemented countermeasures to protect cryptographic algorithms in such resource limited environments as smart-cards from differential power analysis as well as simple power analysis that were first introduced by Kocher et al. in 1999. To defend differential power analysis attacks, Akkar and Giraud presented a Transformed Masking Method and applied it to DES implementation in 2001. Unfortunately, in 2003, Akkar and Goubin showed a superposition attack that actually is a high-order differential power analysis attack on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, and finally they presented a DES implementation using their proposed Unique Masking Method to defend any order differential power analysis attacks, which was later improved by Akkar, Bévan and Goubin in 2004. In this paper, by exploiting a new artifice to classify the electric consumption curves, we show that Akkar, Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method is still vulnerable to a high-order differential power analysis attack. Besides, we find it is also vulnerable to a superposition attack. We also present four new differential power analysis attacks on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method.
Introduction
Lucifer, a block cipher designed by IBM in 1971, was selected as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [13] by NIST [27] in 1977. Since then, DES has been extensively adopted to protect the privacy of the users and the transaction data in a large number of security service applications, say e-commerce, financial service and smart-cards. In the meantime, it has always been the target of many cryptanalysts and there have been quite a lot cryptanalytic results on it during the past nearly thirty years, of which differential cryptanalysis [4] and linear cryptanalysis [22] are two most well-known attacks. These attacks exploit mathematically statistical characteristics between a cipher's inputs and outputs, especially between inputs and outputs of its S-boxes, but do not take its software or hardware implementations into consideration.
However, electronic components are not usually perfectly tamperproof, and they may leak certain sensitive information on the algorithm from some side channels when an embedded cryptographic algorithm is executed, such as the timing of algorithm operations, power consumption and etc.. In 1996, by carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operations, Kocher [17] succeeded to exhibit the first side-channel attack that might find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents [12] , factor RSA keys [31] , and break other cryptosystems. In 1997, Boneh et al. [7] presented another kind of side channel attack -fault analysis, which relies on the fact that hardware faults and errors that occur during the operations of a cryptographic device might leak information about the private key. Subsequently, by combining differential cryptanalysis and fault analysis, Biham et al. [6] presented a differential fault analysis attack, which is also applicable to secret key cryptosystems, for example, DES. In 1998, Kocher et al. [18] introduced a new kind of side channel attack -power analysis that includes simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA), and they published them [19] in 1999. Power analysis starts from the fact that the attacker can get much more information than the knowledge of the inputs and the outputs during the execution of the algorithm, such as the electric consumption or electromagnetic radiations of the circuit devices, then tries to extract information about the secret key of a cryptographic algorithm by studying the power consumption of the electronic devices during the execution of the algorithm. Its initial focus was on DES, but soon was extended to other symmetrical cryptosystems and some public key cryptosystems, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) candidates [8, 15, 23] .
To secure cryptographic algorithms against DPA attacks, two main countermeasure categories have been presented so far. The first is the splitting method due to Goubin et al. [15] and Char et al. [9] , which consists in "splitting" all the intermediate variables using some secret sharing principle; The second is the boolean masking method due to Messerges [25] , which "masks" all the intermediate data if all the fundamental operations used in a given algorithm can be rewritten with masked input data, giving masked output data. A drawback of the splitting method is that it greatly increases the computation time and the memory required, which is a weakness in some constrained environments such as smart-cards, while the masking method is easy and efficient to be implemented in some algorithms, for example DES, and it has received extensive research [10, 11, 16] . In 2001, to counteract the DPA attack, Akkar and Giraud [1] presented a Transformed Masking Method and applied it to DES implementation. The main idea of this masking method is to perform all the computation such that all the data are XORed with a random mask. Moreover, the S-Boxes are modified such that the output of a round is masked by the same mask as the input. Both the two main methods have been proven to be secure against the initial DPA attacks, and are now widely used in real-world implementations of many algorithms. Unfortunately, they do not take into consideration more elaborated attacks, called "High-Order DPA" [19, 24, 26] , which consist in studying correlations between the secret data and several points of the electric consumption curves. In 2003, Akkar and Goubin [2] showed that Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using the Transformed Masking Method was also vulnerable to such a High-Order DPA attack. To protect some secret-key cryptographic algorithms against any order DPA attack, they introduced a new countermeasure called Unique Masking Method, and applied it to DES implementation. However, recently, based on the fact that the output of the S-Box of the second round is unmasked, Akkar, Bévan and Goubin [3] presented an enhanced DPA attack on Akkar and Goubin's DES implementation using Unique Masking Method, and they finally gave an improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method to avoid the enhanced DPA attack. Most recently, there were new advances in power analysis, as follows. Based on the Davies-Murphy attack [5, 14] , Kunz-Jacques et al. [20] presented a new kind of High-Order DPA attack on DES, called DaviesMurphy power attack that is more elaborated than ordinary High-Order DPA attacks. In [30] , Prouff studied certain properties of S-boxes with respect to DPA attacks.
In this paper, we investigate the security of two DES implementations, the Akkar, Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method and the Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, against High-Order DPA attacks. By exploiting a new artifice to classify the electric consumption curves corresponding to the inputs, we show that Akkar Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method is still vulnerable to a DPA attack that uses the outputs of the S-Boxes of the first two rounds. Besides, we find that it is also vulnerable to a superposition attack. Finally, by using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the first two rounds, or the last two rounds, or the second round and the last round, or the first round and the last second round, we present four new DPA attacks on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe DPA and High-Order DPA attacks. In Section 3, we briefly review Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, Akkar and Goubin's DES implementation using Unique Masking Method, and Akkar Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method. In Section 4, we show our High-Order DPA attacks on Akkar Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method. In Section 5, we present four new High-Order DPA attacks on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Description of DPA and High-Order DPA Attacks DPA is an attack that allows to obtain information about the secret key (contained in a smart-card for example), by performing a statistical analysis of the electric consumption records measured for a large number of computations with the same key.
The DPA attack on the DES can be performed as follows (cited from [15] ):
Step 1: We measure the consumption on the first round, for 1000 (for example) DES computations. We denote by M 1 , · · · , M 1000 the input values of those 1000 computations. We denote by C 1 , · · · , C 1000 the 1000 electric consumption curves measured during the computations. We also compute the mean curve M C of those 1000 consumption curves.
Step 2: We focus for instance on the first output bit (as the target bit) of the first S-Box during the first round. Let b be the value of that bit. It is easy to see that b depends on only 6 bits of the secret key. We make an hypothesis on the involved 6 bits. We compute the expected (theoretical) values for b from those 6 bits and from the M i (i = 1, · · · , 1000). This enables us to separate the 1000 inputs M 1 , · · · , M 1000 into two categories: those giving b = 0 and those giving b = 1.
Step 3: We now compute the mean M C 0 of the curves corresponding to inputs of the first category (i.e. the one for which b = 0). If M C and M C 0 show an appreciable difference in a statistical meaning (i.e. a difference much greater than the standard deviation of the measured noise), we consider that the chosen values for the 6 key bits were correct. If M C and M C 0 do not show any sensible difference, we repeat step 2 with another choice for the 6 bits.
Step 4: We repeat steps 2 and 3 with a "target" bit b in the second S-Box, the third, · · ·, until the eighth S-Box. As a result, we finally obtain 48 bits of the secret key.
Step 5: The remaining 8 bits can be found by exhaustive search.
This attack does not require any knowledge about the individual electric consumption of each instruction, nor about the position in time of each of these instructions. It applies exactly the same way as soon as the attacker knows the outputs of the algorithm and the corresponding consumption curves. It only relies on the following fundamental hypothesis [2] :
Fundamental Hypothesis 1 (Order 1) There exists an intermediate variable, that appears during the computation of the algorithm, such that knowing a few key bits (in practice less than 32 bits) allows to decide whether two inputs (respectively two outputs) give or not the same value for a known function of this variable.
High-Order DPA attacks generalize the DPA: the attacker now compute statistical correlations between the electrical consumptions considered at several instants. More precisely, an n-th order DPA attack takes into account n values of the consumption signal, which correspond to n intermediate values occurring during the computation. These attacks rely on the following fundamental hypothesis [2] , Fundamental Hypothesis 2 (Order n) There exists a set of n intermediate variables, that appear during the computation of the algorithm, such that knowing a few key bits (in practice less than 32 bits) allows to decide whether two inputs (respectively two outputs) give or not the same value for a known function of these n variables.
Review of The DES Implementations Using Transformed Masking Method and Unique Masking Method

Akkar and Giraud's DES Implementation Using Transformed Masking Method and Following Attacks
In this subsection, we will briefly describe Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method [1] and Akkar and Goubin's attack [2] . We refer the reader to [1, 2] for details if our description is hard to follow.
Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method
Transformed Masking Method, introduced by Akkar and Giraud [1] , is to perform all the computation that all the data are XORed with a random mask. By using suitably modified S-Boxes, it is possible to have the output of a round masked by exactly the same mask that masks the input. The computation is thus divided into two main steps: the first one consists in generating the modified S-Boxes, and the second one consists in applying the usual computation using these modified S-Boxes with the initial input being masked before starting DES and the final output being unmasked after DES.
Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method is as follows.
One chooses a 64-bit random mask X that will be XORed with the 64-bit message M at the beginning of the DES. Then he starts DES with the value M ⊕ X. When it passes the Initial Permutation, the output value will become IP (M ) ⊕ IP (X), where IP represents the Initial Permutation. At this point, the right and left 32 bits will respectively be IP (M ) 32−63 ⊕ IP (X) 32−63 and
Just before the S-Box after E permutation, there will be an intermediary mask E(IP (X) 32−63 ), where E represents the Expansive Permutation of a DES round. To reestablish the mask IP (X) at each round, Akkar and Giraud used a modified S-Box, denoted by SM-Box. The output of the SM-Box, after the permutation P following S-Box and after being XORed with the left part of the masked message, must have a mask equal to IP (X) 32−63 . To meet this requirement, Akkar and Giraud defined the SM-Box as:
where A is the input of SM-Box, S represents the original DES S-Box function and P −1 denotes the inverse of the permutation P following the S-Box. Therefore, after the input E(IP (M ) 32−63 ) ⊕ E(IP (X) 32−63 ) ⊕ K 1 passes the SM-Box, the value will be
After the value of Eq.(2) passes the P permutation and XORed with the left 32 bits, the value will become Similarly, after executing the left fifteen rounds, the output of the final round will have a mask IP (X) 0−31 ||IP (X) 32−63 , where denotes string concatenation. Since the left right 32 bits and the right 32 bits will interchange before the Final Permutation, so again for the easy implementation, Akkar and Giraud XORed both the right and left 32 bits of the final round with IP (X) 0−31 ⊕ IP (X) 32−63 . So the mask just before the Final Permutation will become IP (X) 0−31 ||IP (X) 32−63 , which will become X after Final Permutation IP −1 . Finally, by taking XOR of the value after Final Permutation with the mask X, one can recover the output of the message as the same output in a DES without countermeasures.
Note that there is always a random mask during each round, so it could prevent the initial DPA attack.
However, Akkar and Goubin [2] showed recently that it cannot withstand a High-Order DPA attack. Now let's briefly describe Akkar and Goubin's attacks in the following subsection.
Akkar and Goubin's attacks on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method
Usual Second-Order DPA In [2], Akkar and Goubin pointed out that their DES Implementation using Transformed Masking Method is subject to a second-order DPA attack. And the real output of the S-Boxes is correlated to the masked value and the random value, as a result, after getting the electrical trace of these two values, one can combine them and get a trace on which a classical DPA attack will work. In order to perform efficiently such an attack, the attacker should know precisely where the interesting values are manipulated.
Superposition Attack Akkar and Goubin's superposition attack is a secondorder DPA attack in theory, but in practice, it is nearly as simple as an usual DPA attack. The idea is as following: in a second order DPA attack, the most difficult thing is to localize the time when the precise needed values are manipulated, but on the contrary, localizing a whole DES round is often quite easy. So instead of correlating precise part of the consumption traces, the attacker will just correlate the whole trace of the first and the last round. With this method, one can notice that the attacker will have the following value T that is the XOR of the two values of the S-Boxes in the first and the last rounds:
where R 15 are the right part of the output (corresponding to the input M and the same keys) of the 15-th round in a DES without countermeasures.
Note that the value T does not depend on the random masking value and that R 15 can be deduced from the output by applying the inverse of the Final Permutation IP −1 . Therefore, it is easy to see that after making a hypothesis on the 2 × 6 bits of the sub-key of the first and last round, it is possible to determine the XORed value of the output of the S-Boxes of the first and last round. After that one can perform an usual DPA attack and find the values of the different sub-keys of K 1 and K 16 .
Akkar, Bévan and Goubin's Improved DES Implementation Using Unique Masking Method
In this subsection, we will briefly describe the Unique Masking Method proposed by Akkar et al. and its application to DES implementation to defend DPA attack. We refer the reader to [2] for details.
Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Unique Masking Method
Unique Masking Method aims at providing a generic protection against any order DPA. The two principles of this method is firstly to mask only the values that depend on less than 32 bits of the key in order to prevent DPA, and secondly intermediate independent variables depending on less than 32 bits of the key should not be masked by the same value in order to thwart High-Order DPA.
Given any 32-bit value α, Akkar et al. firstly defined two new functions S1
and S2 based on the original DES S-Box function S:
Then, they defined f K i to be the composition of the four transformations E, the XOR with the i-th round subkey K i the S-Box and the permutation P . Finally, they defined f 1,K i and f 2,K i by replacing S in f K i with S 1 and S 2 .
Using the function f K i , f 1,K i and f 2,K i , they obtained the following five different rounds using masked or unmasked values:
• A: The left and the right parts of the input are unmasked, and the function is f K i . Therefore, the left and the right parts of the output will also be unmasked.
• B: The left and the right parts of the input are unmasked, but the function is f 2,K i . Therefore, the left part of the output will be unmasked, but the right part will be masked.
• C: The left part of the input is unmasked, but the right part is masked, and the function is f 1,K i . Therefore, the left part of the output will be masked while the right part will be unmasked.
• D: The left part of the input is masked, but the right part is unmasked, and the function is f K i . Therefore, the left part of the output will be unmasked while the right part will be masked.
• E: The left part of the input is masked, but the right part is unmasked, and the function is f 2,K i . Therefore, the left or the right part of the output will be unmasked.
To defend any order DPA attack, they gave a compatible 16 round DES implementation as follows, Furthermore, they pointed out that if one wants the mask never to appear several times, even on values depending on more than 36 bits of the key, one can use the following combination instead of the above one:
It is even possible to add two new masks and to mask every values depending on less than 56 bits of the key.
However, Akkar, Bévan and Goubin [3] showed in FSE'04 that the above DES implementation using Unique Masking Method is vulnerable to an enhanced DPA attack, and finally they gave an improvement, which will be briefly described in the following subsection.
Akkar, Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method
For all the proposed sequences of rounds in last subsection, the second round is always a C-type round. The output of the S-Box of this second round is
which is unmasked and stay unmasked after being XORed with the left part of the message.
Akkar et al. [3] pointed out that the fact that the output of the second round S-Boxes is unmasked will be vulnerable, for one can take the underlined value in Eq. (3) as the data to be acquired by a DPA attack. Based on this point, they presented a DPA attack on the above DES implementation using Unique Masking Method. The main idea of the attack is to retrieve two intermediate values which are not protected against DPA, and then to get the key bits by solving an equation involving the two intermediate values. The attack includes the following three parts:
• First Part:
(1) The attacker performs DES computations with some chosen messages M i (ı = 1, 2, · · · , 1000) for which the right part IP (M i ) 32−63 of the message M i after IP will be set to an arbitrary but constant R 0 . The left part L 0,i will be random. (2) The attacker then performs a first-order DPA attack on the input of each S-Box of the second round. Because the output of the S-Boxes is unmasked, he will determine the value of the second round key XORed with the unknown but constant output of the S-Boxes of the first round. The found value will be:
• Second Part:
(1) Similarly, the attacker performs another first-order DPA with other messages with a different known constant value R * 0 , which will provide:
• Final Part:
(1) By taking XOR of the two values found at last two parts, the attacker can obtain the following value:
The value K 2 vanishes and the linearity of functions E and P gives the attacker the equation:
where E −1 is the inverse of E permutation. (2) Because the attacker knows R 0 and R * 0 , doing a exhaustive search on each 6-bit subkey of K 1 , will give him all the possible values for the subkey K 1 . On average, the differential properties of S will give him about 4 possibilities for each subkey. Since there are 8 subkeys and he also needs to find the 8 bits that are not in K 1 , this gives him 4 8 ·2 8 = 2 24 possibilities on the key. So an exhaustive search with one known plaintext/ciphertext pair will take only a few seconds on a PC.
Finally, to improve the DES implementation by masking the output of the second round, they pointed out that one can use a different mask but the use of α 1 is not forbidden since the bits that are masked by the same value depends on 42 bits of the key, so they defined one more function f 3,K i with the modified S-Boxes
. Hereafter, the output of the S-Boxes of the second round in the improved DES implementation will be
Note that every encryption there will be a random and different value P −1 (α 1 ) that is unknown to the attacker in Eq. (5), so the attacker cannot any longer classify correctly the message M i into two groups, which seems to disable the above attack.
Main Idea of Our Attack
Based on the fact that there is the same mask during the outputs of the SBoxes of the first two rounds in Akkar et al.'s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method, our attacks are also to retrieve two intermediate values which are not protected against DPA by adopting a new technique to classify the electric consumption curves corresponding to the inputs, and then to get the key bits by solving an equation involving the two intermediate values. The new technique is crucial to successfully perform our attacks.
During Akkar et al.'s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method in Section 3.2.2, we can see that:
Step 1: The output of the S-Box of the first round is
Step 2: The output of the S-Box of the second round is Eq.(5).
Step 3: By taking XOR of the two vaues of Eqs. (5) and (6)(i.e. XOR the outputs of the S-Boxes of the first and second rounds), then we get the following Eq. (7):
Therefore, the random value P −1 (α 1 ) vanishes.
From Section 2, we learn that during a DPA attack, the attacker has to compute the value of the target bit and then classifies the electric consumption curves according to this value. Note that in Akkar et al.'s enhanced DPA attack in Section 3.2.2, the attacker is so lucky that he can explicitly get the value of the target bit in Eq.(3) corresponding to the message M after he makes an hypothesis on the six bits of the underlined value in Eq.(3). However, it is obvious that he will not be so lucky to get the value of the target bit depending on less than 32 key bits in Eq. (7), for after he makes an hypothesis on the six bits of the underlined value in Eq. (7), he has to compute S(K 1 ⊕ E(IP (M ) 32−63 )) from this hypothesized underlined value when he computes the value of some target bit in Eq. (7), which will depend on more than 32 bits of key. On the other hand, only after he knows all the 32 bits of S(K 1 ⊕ E(IP (M ) 32−63 )) could he compute the value of the target bit in Eq. (7). This incurs a main difference between our following attack and Akkar et al.'s enhanced DPA attack in Section 3.2.2.
Fortunately, we exploit a new technique to correctly classify the 1000 electric consumption curves corresponding to some 1000 (for example) inputs. Note in Eq. (7) that given K 1 , if IP (M ) 32−63 is set to some arbitrary but fixed value, then S(K 1 ⊕ E(IP (M ) 32−63 )) will also be fixed. So if we classify the 1000 electric consumption curves corresponding to the 1000 inputs (the right 32 bits of each message after IP is fixed to a constant) according to some target bit in Eq. (7), we can also classify them to the same two groups according to the corresponding bit of
Therefore, similar to Akkar et al.'s DPA attack in Section 3.2.2, we can perform a DPA attack with some chosen messages to acquire the value of
) and then perform another DPA attack with some different chosen messages to acquire a similar value. Finally, we can retrieve the key K 1 by taking XOR of the two acquired values.
We will show the details of our attack in the following subsection.
Our Concrete Attack
Step 1: During Eq. (8), letting
we now study on the following equation
Step 2: We fix the right 32 bits IP (M i ) 32−63 of a message M i after the initial IP to an arbitrary but constant M R , and choose 1000 (for example) random 32-bit M Li (i = 1, 2, · · · , 1000) as the left 32 bits of the 1000 inputs after IP. As what we describe in Section 2, by using these 1000 inputs, we can obviously apply a DPA attack to acquire θ R ,
Step 3: By changing M R to another different one M R * , we can acquire the corresponding θ R * ,
Step 4: By taking XOR of Eq. (9) and (10), we get the following equation,
Step 5: From Eq.(11), we get
Note that Eq. (12) is similar to Eq.(4) except the vaues of the four known parameters M R * , M R , θ R * and θ R , so this again gives us 4 8 ·2 8 = 2 24 possibilities on the key. Consequently, as mentioned by Akkar et al. in [3] , an exhaustive search with one known plaintext/ciphertext pair will take only a few seconds on a PC. Therefore, Akkar et al.'s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method is still vulnerable to DPA attack.
Note: By fixing the right 32 bits of each message after IP to some arbitrary value and letting the left 32 bits change to get the enough inputs, we can correctly get the underlined value in Eqn. (7) and K 1 simultaneously by performing a superposition attack similar to the one in Section 3.1.2.
Our Four New Attacks on Akkar and Giraud's DES Implementation Using Transformed Masking Method
Instead of using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the first round and last round of Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, our new attack uses the outputs of the S-Boxes of the first two rounds, or the last two rounds, or the second round and the last round, or the first round and the last second round. The main idea of the attack using the first two rounds or the last two rounds is similar to the attack in Section 4.1, while the attack using the second round and the last round, or the first round and the last second round, is somewhat similar to the superposition attack in Section 3.1.2.
Attacks Using the First Two Rounds or the Last Two Rounds
During Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method in Section 3.1.1, we can see that,
Step 1: The output of the SM-Box of the first round is
Step 2: The output of the SM-Box of the second round is
Step 3: By taking XOR of the two vaues of Eqs. (13) and (14)(that is, XOR the outputs of the S-Boxes of the first and second rounds), then we get the following
Therefore, the random value P −1 (IP (X) 32−63 ⊕ IP (X) 0−31 ) vanishes.
Step 4: In the following, we can perform an attack similar to the one in Section 4.2.
Similarly, by using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the last two rounds, we can perform another attack on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, which is a chosen ciphertext attack. Since the right part of the final output of Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method is still required to be set to a arbitrary but constant value as in the above attack, the attacker could succeed only if he could collect the required enough outputs that have the same right 32 bits. Anyway, this attack threatens Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method.
Attacks Using the Second Round and the Last Round or the First Round and the Last Second Round
We assume that C is the output corresponding to the input M . Then the value before the Final Permutation is IP −1 (C), therefore we can get the output, L 16 ||R 16 , of the last round as
. Finally, we can deduce out the output L 15 ||R 15 of the 15-th round and the output L 14 ||R 14 of the 14-th round as follows,
By using Eq. (15), we can get the XOR of the outputs of S-Boxes of the second round and the last round in Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method as follows, S (K 2 ⊕ E(R 1 )) ⊕ S(K 16 ⊕ E(R 15 )) = S(K 2 ⊕ E(P (S(K 1 ⊕ E(IP (M ) 32−63 )))) ⊕ E(IP (M ) 0−31 )) ⊕ S(K 16 ⊕ E(IP −1 (C) 32−63 )).
Therefore, the random value P −1 (IP (X) 32−63 ⊕ IP (X) 0−31 ) vanishes, again.
Then, after by fixing the right 32 bits of each message after IP to some arbitrary value and letting the left 32 bits change to get the enough inputs, we can easily get the correct underlined value in Eq.(16) and K 16 simultaneously by performing a High-Order DPA attack similar to the superposition attack in Section 3.1.2, given that we could choose the inputs and get their respective outputs.
The case for the first and the last second rounds is similar except that we should get the enough outputs that have the same right 32 bits, which may be impossible in practice, but in theory it is feasible.
Conclusions
In CHES'01, Akkar and Giraud presented a Transformed Masking Method to defend the DPA attack and applied it to DES implementation. Unfortunately, by using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the first and last rounds, Akkar and Goubin showed in FSE'03 a High-Order DPA attack on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, and finally they presented a DES implementation using their proposed Unique Masking Method to defend any order DPA attacks, which was later improved by Akkar, Bévan and Goubin in [3] . However, in this paper, we show that Akkar, Bévan and Goubin's improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method is still vulnerable to DPA attacks. We also presented four new DPA attacks on Akkar and Giraud's DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method.
A new technique to classify the electric consumption curves corresponding to the inputs is introduced in this paper.
As a further work, Lv et al. [21] summarized and proved five basic requirements for a DES implementation using masking methods to defense High-Order DPA attacks, and then presented an enhancement on Akkar et al. 's DES implementation using Unique Masking Method. The enhanced DES implementation requires only three random 32-bit masks and six additional S-Boxes to be gen-erated every computation, which was proved to be the minimal cost for a DES implementation masking all the outputs of the S-Boxes of the sixteen rounds to be secure against High-Order DPA attacks.
In November 2001, NIST declared the advanced encryption standard -AES [29] for the next generation. Nowadays, just as the referee mentioned, DES is becoming older and older for regular computing applications, though it is still alive in the smart-card world with its extremely limited computational resources. We hope those results obtained on DES so far could be taken on AES.
